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I.  INTRODUCTION 
For decades, a debate has been raging within religious circles: now that science 
has provided consumers with ways to avoid pregnancy, is utilization of these 
methods interference with God’s will?  Each denomination and sect has a different 
answer to that question, but some religious groups, in their context as employers, 
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have resisted legislation that mandates insurance coverage of prescription 
contraceptives because they believe that being required to provide these services is a 
violation of their First Amendment right to religious free exercise.1  States have 
attempted to remedy this issue through legislative conscience clauses that exempt 
religious employers from state requirements to provide contraceptive services.  Each 
state has its own definition of a religious employer, thus, providing non-uniform 
protection to both women who desire these services and employers who feel their 
freedoms are being violated. 
The tension between gender equality and the Free Exercise clause is well-
illustrated in California, where a religious entity has challenged legislation 
mandating contraceptive coverage.2  The California legislature passed contraceptive 
equity legislation3 that included a narrow conscience clause for religious employers.  
The legislation allows a religious exemption for employers who meet the following 
criteria: “(A) the inculcation of religious values is the purpose of the entity; (B) the 
entity primarily employs persons who share the religious tenets of the entity; (C) the 
entity serves primarily persons who share the religious tenets of the entity; and (D) 
the entity is a nonprofit organization” as described in 26 U.S.C. 6033 (a)(2)(A)(i) or 
(iii).4  Catholic Charities of Sacramento, a religiously funded charitable organization, 
failed to meet the requirements of sections (B) and (C) of the California legislation 
and filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the state statute that requires 
employers that provide health insurance prescription coverage to include coverage 
for contraceptives.5  On appeal from an initial denial of plaintiff’s motion for a 
preliminary injunction, the California Third District Court of Appeals denied the 
organization’s petition for a writ of mandate,6 holding that the trial court properly 
denied the injunction, “since it was not reasonably probable that [the] plaintiff’s 
action would prevail on the merits.”7  Catholic Charities appealed this decision to the 
California Supreme Court; oral arguments were heard on December 2, 2003.8   
The outcome of the Catholic Charities case could have a significant impact 
nationally since many states either have or are considering adopting similar 
legislation.9  In addition, the United States Congress is considering the Equity in 
                                                                
1Catholic Charities of Sacramento v. Superior Court, 90 Cal. App. 4th 425 (Cal. App. 3d 
Dist. 2001). 
2Id. 
3CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(b) (West 2002); CAL. INS. CODE 
§ 10123.1969(d) (West 2002). 
4CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(b) (West 2002); CAL. INS. CODE 
§ 10123.1969(d) (West 2002).  
5Catholic Charities, 90 Cal. App. 4th at 425. 
6Id.  
7Id. at 425. 
8California Supreme Court, available at http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/ (last 
accessed February 18, 2003). 
9Center for Reproductive Law and Policy, Contraceptive Equity Bills Gain Momentum in 
State Legislatures, (July 2003), available at http://www.crlp.org/pub_fac_epicchart.html (last 
accessed October 8, 2002) [hereinafter Center for Reproductive Law and Policy]. 
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Prescription Insurance and Contraceptive Coverage Act (EPICC),10 which, to ensure 
passage, will most likely include some form of conscience clause.11 
The Catholic Charities case calls into question the limits of the Constitution’s 
Free Exercise clauses12 and reflects the conflict between the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act (PDA) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.13  PDA of 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects women from unequal treatment in 
the workplace,14 while the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution 
provide citizens with the freedom to follow their religious ideals and the freedom 
from state interference with religious practices.15   
This note will attempt to address the interrelationship of the PDA and the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments in the context of contraceptive equity legislation.  To 
that end, the note will examine states’ definitions of a “religious employer” and 
make recommendations regarding statutory language that is broad enough to cover 
those organizations with conscientious objections to contraception but narrow 
enough to allow women to have ready access to contraceptive services.  Following 
this introduction, Part II of the note will provide background information about both 
contraceptive equity and religious freedom.  Part III will discuss current and 
proposed contraceptive equity legislation in the states.  Part IV will provide 
recommendations for appropriate language.  The conclusion is Part V. 
II.  CONTRACEPTIVE EQUITY AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
A.  Social and Economic Benefits of Providing Contraceptive Coverage 
There are many social and economic benefits to providing contraceptive 
coverage to employees.  The proportion of women using birth control has been on 
the rise since the 1980’s.16  By 1995, sixty-four percent of all women between the 
ages of fifteen and forty-four were practicing some method of contraception.17  In 
fact, for every ten American women who are sexually active, nine do not wish to 
become pregnant.18  A woman who wishes to have only two children in her lifetime 
                                                                
10Equity in Prescription Insurance and Contraceptive Coverage (EPICC) Act of 2003 
S. 1396.15 108th Cong. (2003) [hereinafter EPICC]. 
11Cheryl A. Danner, Prescription Contraceptives: Educate Yourself on the Discrimination 
You May Be Suffering Because You Work for a Private Educational Institution, 31 J.L. & 
EDUC. 513, 518 (2002). 
12U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV, § 1.  
13Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(k) (1994). 
14Id. 
15U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV, § 1.. 
16The Media Resource, News on the Horizon: Do Women Have a “Right” to Birth Control 
Coverage in Their Health Plans?, available at http://www.mediastrat.com/pages 
/n0102fact.html (last accessed Sept. 20, 2002) [hereinafter The Media Resource].  
17Id.  
18Megan Colleen Roth, Note, Rocking the Cradle with Erikson v. Bartell Drug Co.: 
Contraceptive Insurance Coverage Takes a Step Forward, 70 UMKC L. REV. 781, 786 (2002). 
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2004
444 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:441 
and who wishes to remain sexually active must use contraceptives for more than 
twenty years of her life.19 
Contraceptive coverage does not come without economic cost.  The Women’s 
Research and Education Institute has estimated that during a woman’s childbearing 
years, her out-of-pocket health expenditures are sixty-eight percent more than those 
of her male counterparts.20  Most of these costs are associated with reproductive 
health care services, whether they be pregnancy-related or for contraception.21   
Although contraceptive coverage is costly, using contraceptives saves health 
dollars that would otherwise be spent to pay for the consequences of having 
unprotected sex–unintended pregnancy and, depending on the method of 
contraception used, sexually transmitted diseases.22  “Almost sixty percent of the 6.3 
million pregnancies that occur annually in the United States are unintended”—higher 
than any other developed country except France.23  More than half of all unintended 
pregnancies occur among the ten percent of women “who report that they do not use 
birth control.”24   
Unintended pregnancy has a number of adverse consequences, including 
increased infant morbidity and mortality, the financial costs of childbirth and the care 
of distressed newborns, high rates of abortion, and limited women’s abilities to work 
outside the home.25   
Financially, unintended pregnancies take a significant toll on both personal 
family wealth and national assets.  “It was estimated that by 1990: “the nation will 
have spent at least $2.1 billion in first-year costs alone to care for the excess numbers 
of low birth-weight infants who need extensive medical care . . . . Reducing 
unintended pregnancy is the single most effective means of reducing the number of 
distressed, low birth-weight babies.”26 
By reducing the number of unintended pregnancies, the United States can also 
reduce the abortion rate.27  Nearly fifty percent of unintended pregnancies end in 
abortion, equaling an estimated 1.4 million abortions a year.28  These abortions 
impose physical and emotional costs on women.29  Easily available, affordable 
contraception decreases the number of abortions.30 
                                                                
19Id.  
20The Media Resource, supra note 16. 
21Id. 
22Sylvia A. Law, Sex Discrimination and Insurance for Contraception, 73 WASH. L. REV. 
363 (1998). 
23Id. at 364. 
24Id. 
25Id. at 364-65. 
26Id. at 365. 
27Roth, supra note 18, at 786. 
28Id.  
29Law, supra note 22, at 367. 
30Id.  
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Women bear the brunt of the adverse social and economic consequences of 
unintended pregnancy.  In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the U.S. Supreme Court 
affirmed that “[t]he ability of women to participate equally in the economic and 
social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their 
reproductive lives.”31  Unplanned and unwanted pregnancies hinder women and 
prevent them from participating fully in society.  
B.  The Cost to Employers of Providing Contraceptive Coverage 
Although there is a cost to employers of extending coverage for contraceptive 
services, that cost is not significant.  Adding coverage for the full range of medical 
contraceptives—which includes birth control pills, implants, injections, IUDs or 
diaphragms—would cost a total of $21.40 per employee per year, $17 of which 
would be paid by employers, increasing an employee’s contribution by only $4.28 
yearly.32  The actual cost is likely less because with adequate contraceptive coverage, 
there would be fewer unintended pregnancies, which are costly to insurers and 
employers alike.33  According to the Washington Business Health Group, providing 
coverage for all contraceptive methods does actually reduces costs. The Group’s 
study found that in a company of 80,000 employees—half of whom were women—
the overall per employee cost when the employer did not cover contraceptives was 
seventeen percent higher than when the employer provided contraceptive benefits.  
By factoring in costs of unintended pregnancies, the study found an average annual 
direct cost per employee to be $431 if the employer provided contraceptive coverage.  
In contrast, it would cost $494 a year if the employer excluded contraceptive 
coverage.34  Thus, contraceptive coverage, according to this study, led to a fourteen 
percent reduction in reproductive-related claims.35 
C.  Title VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
No federal law explicitly mandates prescription contraceptive coverage.36  
Accordingly, there is no uniform, non-discriminatory prescription drug policy within 
the insurance industry.37  It is, however, possible to interpret Title VII and the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act to require such coverage. 
                                                                
31505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992). 
32The Media Resource, supra note 16. 
33Pregnancy itself creates costs to employers for time off, training for replacement 
employees, among other costs.   
34The Media Resource, supra note 16. 
35More than two-thirds of women rely on private insurance to help them finance medical 
care.  The Kaiser Family Foundation and the Health Research and Education Trust surveyed 
employers in 2000 and found that there are notable gaps in coverage of oral contraceptives by 
type of health plan.  Among workers who had coverage under a health maintenance 
organization (HMO), contraceptives were covered eighty-seven percent of the time.  Workers 
covered under conventional insurance plans had the least access to contraceptive services, 
being covered only sixty percent of the time.  See id. 
36Roth, supra note 18, at 789. 
37Id.  
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In 1964, Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which is the primary 
federal anti-discrimination law.38  The goal of Title VII was “to end years of 
discrimination in employment and to place all men and women, regardless of race, 
color, religion or national origin, on equal footing in how they were treated in the 
workforce.”39  Title VII, in its almost thirty years of existence, has been interpreted 
to protect women’s reproductive health choices, primarily through the addition of the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act.   
D.  Title VII and the PDA require contraceptive equity 
Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of race, sex, 
religion or national origin.40  For many years, the relationship between pregnancy 
and sex discrimination was ambiguous in the minds of judges interpreting Title VII, 
since the statute itself did not even mention pregnancy.41  This relationship was 
brought to the forefront of the national conscience with the United States Supreme 
Court’s controversial decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert.42   
In Gilbert, the Supreme Court held that an employer’s short-term disability 
policy that excludes pregnancy or pregnancy-related disabilities from coverage is not 
discrimination on the basis of sex.43  The majority based its opinion on two findings: 
(a) pregnancy discrimination does not “adversely impact all women and therefore is 
not the same thing as gender discrimination; and (b) disability insurance which 
covers the same illnesses and conditions for both men and women is equal 
coverage.”44  Since men and women were treated facially equally, the Court held that 
there was no discrimination.45  Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens dissented 
from this opinion and argued that “(a) women, as the only sex at risk for pregnancy, 
were being subjected to unlawful discrimination; and (b) in determining whether an 
employment policy treats the sexes equally, the court must look at the 
comprehensiveness of the coverage provided to each sex.”46    
In 1978, in response to General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, Congress clarified its 
intentions regarding gender discrimination by amending Title VII to add the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA).47  In enacting the PDA, Congress adopted the 
position of the dissenters in Gilbert by recognizing that sex-based differences existed 
between male and female employees.48 In light of these differences, Congress 
                                                                
3842 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2003). 
39Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1269 (W.D. Wash. 2001). 
4042 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2003). 
41Shannon Roberson Loeser, Gender Discrimination, the Pill & the High Cost of 
Insurance, 1 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 125, 126 (2002). 
42General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).  
43Id. at 145. 
44Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1270 (citing Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125). 
45Id.  
46Id. (citing Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125). 
47Id. 
48Roth, supra note 18, at 784. 
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required that employers provide single-sex benefits where applicable.49  Essentially, 
the PDA is a definition of terms and phrases within Title VII.50  It provides: 
[t]he terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include, but are 
not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or 
related medical conditions; and women . . . shall be treated the same for 
all employment- related purposes, including receipt of benefits under 
fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in 
their ability or inability to work . . . .51 
The Supreme Court further clarified the boundaries of the law as it related to 
equality in insurance coverage.52  In Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. 
v. EEOC,53 a group of male plaintiffs sued their employer alleging that the 
company’s policy of not providing pregnancy-related coverage to the spouses of the 
employees violated the PDA.  Because the female employees themselves had 
pregnancy-related insurance coverage and because the female employees’ spouses 
were fully covered under the insurance plan, the Court held that the employer’s 
policy violated Title VII and the PDA.54  The Court reasoned that the company 
provided men with less insurance coverage than they provided women employees 
and that inequality of insurance coverage was a violation of the PDA.55    
Another case that explored the limits of the PDA was Int’l Union v. Johnson 
Controls.56  The employer, a battery manufacturing company, had a policy of 
requiring only female employees to provide proof that they were not capable of 
reproducing prior to being allowed to work with lead, which could potentially 
damage a fetus.57  The Supreme Court found this policy to be a violation of the PDA, 
holding that classification of employees based upon their ability to become pregnant, 
whether or not an employee was pregnant, is sex-based discrimination.58  Thus, the 
Court held that the PDA covers a woman’s potential to become pregnant, as well as 
the pregnancy itself.    
The PDA thus provides protection based on women’s capacity to become 
pregnant and requires equal protection in terms of insurance coverage for individuals 
of both genders.  The statute does not, however, explicitly mention prescription 
                                                                
49Id. 
50Id. 
5142 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2003). 
52Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1270. 
53462 U.S. 669 (1983). 
54Id. at 683-84. 
55Id.  
56499 U.S. 187 (1991). 
57Id. at 190. 
58Id. at 191-192. 
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contraceptives.59  Therefore, it is unclear whether the denial of contraceptive 
coverage is, in the words of the PDA, discrimination “on the basis of pregnancy.”60 
E.  The EEOC Decision 
The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the federal agency 
charged with enforcing and interpreting Title VII and the PDA, issued a decision in 
2000 which stated that “the PDA’s prohibition on discrimination against women 
based on their ability to become pregnant thus necessarily includes a prohibition on 
discrimination related to a woman’s use of contraceptives.”61  The EEOC issued this 
ruling in a claim brought by two individuals who filed charges against their 
employers alleging that the employers’ failure to offer insurance coverage for the 
cost of prescription drugs and devices violated the PDA.62 
In reaching its conclusion, the EEOC stated that “[c]ontraception is a means by 
which a woman controls her ability to become pregnant.”63  The Commission 
reasoned that because employers are not permitted to discharge employees from their 
jobs because they use contraceptives, employers also “may not discriminate in their 
health insurance plan by denying benefits for prescription contraceptives when they 
provide benefits for comparable drugs and devices.”64   
The EEOC also relied on language in the PDA that allows employers to limit 
coverage for abortions.  The EEOC concluded that Congress intended the PDA to 
require that employers cover all pregnancy-related medical expenses unless the 
statute provided an explicit exemption.65  Thus, if Congress had wanted to exclude 
prescription contraception from coverage, it would have.66  Accordingly, the EEOC 
ruled that by not exempting contraceptive services, Congress intended to include 
contraceptive equity in the PDA.67   
In addition, the EEOC stated that Congress clearly expressed an intention to 
cover contraceptives in enacting the PDA.68  The Commission noted that in 
Congressional debate members of Congress expressed that the PDA intended to 
prohibit discrimination against women “based on ‘the whole range of matters 
concerning the childbearing process’ and gave women ‘the right . . . to be financially 
                                                                
59Roth, supra note 18, at 784. 
60Id. 
61Commission Decision on Coverage of Contraception, 2000 WL 33407187 (Dec. 14, 
2000). 
62Id.  The insurance plans covered medical treatments and services, including prescription 
drugs, yet excluded all types of prescription contraceptive drugs and devices, regardless of 
their medical purpose.   
63Id.  
64Id.  
65Id. 
66Id. 
67Id.  
68Id.  
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and legally protected before, during and after [their] pregnancies.’”69  The EEOC 
construed these Congressional statements to mean that inclusion of prescription 
contraceptives was part of the “whole range” of the childbearing process, and that 
Congress intended to include these devices under the PDA.70  
F.  Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co. 
In 2001, the United States District Court in the Western District of Washington 
heard Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co.,71 a case of first impression in the federal courts 
addressing “whether the selective exclusion of prescription contraception from 
defendant’s generally comprehensive prescription plan constitutes discrimination on 
the basis of sex.”72  Ultimately, the judge in Erickson held that the PDA does apply 
to contraceptive equity claims.73 
Jennifer Erickson, a twenty-seven year old pharmacist, was the lead plaintiff in a 
class action suit brought against Erickson’s employer, Bartell Drug Company.74  The 
company’s prescription drug plan for non-union employees specifically excluded 
contraceptives, although it covered other prescription drugs, including many 
preventative drugs and devices, such as blood pressure drugs, hormone replacement 
therapies, and drugs to prevent blood clotting, among others.75  The court recognized 
that the drug plan was part of the employees’ “compensation, terms, conditions or 
privileges of employment” that are protected under Title VII.76  Through analysis of 
precedent-setting PDA cases and the meaning of Title VII, the court concluded that 
Bartell Drug Company’s prescription drug policy was in violation of the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.77   
In its analysis, the court revealed that although employers do not have to cover 
any contraceptive services, if they choose to provide prescription coverage, they 
must provide equivalent insurance coverage for contraception.78  Because 
prescription contraceptives are used only by women, the court stated that the 
defendant’s choice to exclude the benefit from its generally applicable benefit plan 
was discriminatory.79   
                                                                
69Id.  See also H.R. Rep. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978), 124 Cong. Rec. H38, 574 
(daily ed. October 14, 1978) (statement of Rep. Sarasin, a manager of the House version of the 
PDA). 
70Commission Decision on Coverage of Contraception, 2000 WL 33407187 (Dec. 14, 
2000).  
71141 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (W.D. Wash. 2001). 
72Id. at 1268. 
73Id. at 1277. 
74Roth, supra note 18, at 785. 
75Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1268 n.1. 
76Id. at 1268 n.3. 
77Roth, supra note 18 at 789. 
78Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1272. 
79Id.  
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In addition, the court noted that Title VII “requires employers to recognize the 
differences between the sexes and provide equally comprehensive coverage, even if 
that means providing additional benefits to cover women-only expenses.”80   
While the decision in Erickson was a positive step for women seeking 
contraceptive coverage, the PDA does not provide women who desire access to 
contraceptive services with full protection against discrimination.81  For example, 
Title VII and the PDA are only available to employees of companies with fifteen or 
more employees,82 leaving women or the spouses of men who work for small 
companies with no protection unless their state’s discrimination laws have a Title 
VII analogue with a lower employee threshold.  In the absence of an explicit statute 
requiring contraceptive equity, women will have to bring claims under the PDA to 
enforce their rights.  Such claims are costly financially and emotionally.  In addition, 
women may find it difficult to locate attorneys willing to accept discrimination cases 
in which the damages are so low.83  
G.  State Legislation 
Many states have attempted to enact legislation to address inequities in insurance 
coverage.84  These states have taken a variety of approaches in crafting legislation.85  
The benefit of state legislation is that it directly mandates contraceptive equity; 
however, such legislation often has its limitations.  Depending on the language a 
state adopts, women’s access may still be limited.86  For example, while most states 
with contraceptive equity laws mandate that “any and all” FDA approved 
contraceptives are covered, insurance companies may interpret this language to mean 
“‘any’ and ‘all’ FDA approved categories rather than individual brands.”87  This 
difference in interpretation can have a significant medical impact, particularly in 
regard to the birth control pill.88  
Also, oftentimes individual state laws only cover small employer-based/group 
policies, individual insurance plans, and Medicaid.89  Employers who hold self-
insured plans can be exempted under the Federal Income Retirement Security Act of 
1974 (ERISA), which preempts state legislation.  In the best-case scenario, because 
of these limitations, the maximum number of women who could benefit from state 
legislation is thirteen percent.90 
                                                                
80Id.  
81See Danner, supra note 11 at 515. 
82Id. at 516. 
83Id.  
84Center for Reproductive Law and Policy, supra note 9. 
85Id.  
86Danner, supra note 11 at 516-17. 
87Sarah E. Bycott, Controversy Aroused: North Carolina Mandates Insurance Coverage of 
Contraceptives in the Wake of Viagra, 79 N.C. L. REV. 779, 805 (2001). 
88Id.  
89Roth, supra note 18 at 788-89. 
90Id. at 789. 
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Sole reliance on state legislation to provide women with contraceptive equity 
would also create an imbalance in coverage among citizens of different states, since 
some states offer greater coverage than others, and some states offer no coverage at 
all.  With this lack of uniformity among the states, women will not achieve full 
equality nationwide.91   
H.  Federal Contraceptive Equity Statutes 
Given the limitations to state legislation, the best source of protection for women 
would be at the federal level.92  Federal legislation could require that all employers 
that provide prescription coverage extend the same benefits for contraceptive 
services.93 
Federal employees already reap the benefits of contraceptive equity.  The Federal 
Employees Health Benefits Plan (FEHBP) was the first federal statute passed that 
related to insurance coverage for prescription contraceptives.94  The FEHBP, also 
called the “Lowey Amendment,” gave federal employees coverage of all five of the 
FDA approved prescription contraceptive drugs and devices. 
Members of Congress attempted to expand access to contraceptive equity to 
private employers through the Equity in Prescription Insurance and Contraceptive 
Coverage Act (EPICC),95 which was introduced in Congress in 1997, 1999 and 2001.  
EPICC requires that if “a health insurance plan covers benefits for other FDA 
approved prescription drugs or devices, it must also cover benefits for FDA approved 
prescription contraception drugs or devices.”96  The act further requires that plans 
that provide other outpatient services must also provide outpatient contraceptive 
services.97  EPICC may be the answer to inequities in insurance coverage, but it has 
yet to achieve passage in Congress. 
I.  Religious Free Exercise 
Whether the efforts to provide equality in prescription contraceptive coverage are 
made at the state or the federal level, all legislators are faced with the conundrum of 
requiring equality while not running afoul of an employer’s right to religious free 
exercise.  America, a nation founded on the ideal of religious freedom, remains 
wedded to the notion that the government should not intrude upon religious 
                                                                
91See Equity in Prescription Insurance and Contraceptive Coverage Act: Hearings on 
S. 766 Before the Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 105th Congress (1998) (statement 
of Richard H. Schwarz, M.D., Chairman of the Dep’t of Obstetrics and Gynecology, New 
York Methodist Hosp.).   
92Danner, supra note 11, at 518. 
93Id.  
94Lisa A. Hayden, Gender Discrimination Within the Reproductive Health Care System: 
Viagra v. Birth Control, 13 J.L. & HEALTH 171, 196 (1999). 
95Equity in Prescription Insurance and Contraceptive Coverage Act, S.104, 107th Cong. 
§ 704 (2001) [hereinafter EPICC]. 
96Hayden, supra note 94, at 197. 
97Id. 
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practice.98  The First Amendment of the Constitution explicitly states that Congress 
shall make no law prohibiting the free exercise of religion.99  This freedom, however, 
is restricted once one’s religious conduct begins inflicting harm on others.100 
J.  Extension of the First Amendment to State Action 
The First Amendment originally applied only to the federal government.101  The 
first application of the Free Exercise clause to the states was in 1940.102  In that year, 
the Supreme Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut held that the Fourteenth Amendment 
incorporated the religious liberty clauses of the First Amendment and rendered state 
legislatures incompetent to enact laws that impinged on religious free exercise.103  In 
1947, the Court held in Everson v. Board of Education104 that the First Amendment 
“requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers 
and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary.  State power is 
no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them”105   
The Supreme Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut began articulating the situations 
in which a state could take actions that would infringe on individuals’ free exercise 
rights.  The court distinguished religious belief from religious conduct, stating that:  
[f]reedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious 
organization or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be 
restricted by law.  On the other hand, [the First Amendment] safeguards 
the free exercise of the chosen form of religion.  Thus the Amendment 
embraces two concepts, freedom to believe and freedom to act.  The first 
is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be.  Conduct 
remains subject to regulation for the protection of society . . . . In every 
case the power to regulate must be so exercised so as not, in attaining a 
possible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom.106 
Cantwell made clear that while religious belief and speech are fully protected by 
the Free Exercise Clause, religiously motivated conduct is entitled to less 
                                                                
98April A. Cherry, The Free Exercise Rights of Pregnant Women Who Refuse Medical 
Treatment, 69 TENN. L. REV. 563, 568 (2002).   
99It should be noted that there are actually two clauses in the U.S. Constitution that relate 
to religion; the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause, both found within the First 
Amendment.  For my purposes, I will focus on the Free Exercise Clause, since the 
establishment of a state religion is not what is implicated in legislation governing prescription 
drug coverage.   
100Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
101Cherry, supra note 98, at 569.   
102Id.  
103Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303.   
104330 U.S. 1 (1947).  
105Id. at 18. 
106Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303-04. 
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protection.107  Thus, a state may regulate religiously motivated conduct so long as the 
regulations are made only to protect society.108  “State regulations must be narrowly 
tailored so as not to suppress the free exercise of religion or unduly censor religious 
activity.”109 
Many courts have applied Cantwell and have found that religiously motivated 
conduct that inflicts harms on others is not protected by the Free Exercise doctrine.  
For example, in Bob Jones Univ. v. United States,110 the University attempted to 
maintain its tax-exempt status despite its policies encouraging racial discrimination 
in admissions, which it claimed were justified by the school’s religious beliefs.111  
The Court reasoned that “not all burdens on religion are unconstitutional . . . . The 
state may justify a limitation on religious liberty by showing that it is essential to 
accomplish an overriding governmental interest.”112  Because racially discriminatory 
schools “exert a pervasive influence on the entire educational process”,113 it was held 
that denial of tax exempt status was an appropriate action and not in violation of the 
Free Exercise clause.114   
Historically, the Supreme Court used the compelling state interest test to 
determine whether a state’s regulation was permitted.  Under the compelling state 
interest test, a state was constitutionally required to accommodate an adherent’s 
exercise of his or her religious beliefs even when that exercise conflicted with a law 
of general applicability, unless restricting the adherent’s free exercise was necessary 
to serve a compelling state interest.115  This test was first applied in Sherbert v. 
Verner,116 where the Court held that the state’s interest in preventing the filing of 
fraudulent unemployment compensation claims was not compelling enough to 
infringe on a citizen’s First Amendment rights.117  The plaintiff in Sherbert, a 
Seventh-Day Adventist, was discharged from her job because she refused to work on 
Saturday, her religion’s Sabbath day.118   This refusal to work on Saturdays led to her 
inability to find new work and subsequent application for unemployment benefits.119  
The state of South Carolina denied her unemployment benefits because she would 
                                                                
107Id.  
108Cherry, supra note 98, at 576. 
109Id.  
110461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
111Id. at 577. 
112Id. at 603. 
113Id. at 604 n.29. 
114Id. at 605.  
115Cherry, supra note 98, at 579. 
116374 U.S. 398 (1963).  
117Id at 407. 
118Id. at 400. 
119Id. 
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not accept suitable work when offered.120  The Supreme Court found that South 
Carolina’s unemployment statute abridged the plaintiff’s free exercise of religion 
because there was no compelling state interest involved in South Carolina’s 
unemployment eligibility scheme.121   In Sherbert, the Supreme Court further noted 
that even if the state had proven a compelling state interest, it would still be required 
to show that there were no less restrictive means available to achieve its goals.122  
Under this test, when a state was unable to demonstrate a compelling state interest, 
the Court required the state to accommodate the believer’s exercise of religion by 
exempting the believer from the regulation.123  Interests that have been found to be 
compelling under this test include the payment of social security taxes,124 the 
elimination of racial discrimination,125 and the assignment of social security 
numbers.126    
K.  Current Interpretations of Neutral Laws of General Applicability 
More recently, the Supreme Court retreated from the Sherbert line of cases and 
limited the applicability of the strict scrutiny test.  In Employment Division v. 
Smith,127 the Court held that exemptions from neutral laws of general applicability 
are almost never required under the Constitution.128  In Smith, two drug rehabilitation 
counselors were denied unemployment benefits after being fired from their jobs at an 
Oregon rehabilitation center.129  The employees were members of the Native 
American Church, the adherents to which used peyote as part of their religious 
practice.130  Since use of peyote, a hallucinogenic drug, was against the state’s 
controlled substance law, the state unemployment compensation agency denied the 
employees’ unemployment claims, stating that the two had been discharged for 
work-related misconduct.131  The plaintiffs claimed that the denial of unemployment 
compensation for their religiously-motivated actions was a violation of their right to 
free exercise.  The Supreme Court held that the Free Exercise clause did not prohibit 
the state from denying unemployment compensation for work-related misconduct 
based on the use of peyote.132  It stated that: 
                                                                
120Id. at 401. 
121Id. at 406-409. 
122Id. at 407.  
123Cherry, supra note 98, at 579.   
124United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982). 
125Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
126Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986).   
127494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
128Id. at 884. 
129Id. at 874. 
130Id.  
131Id. (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 457.992(4) (1987); OR. ADMIN. R. 855-80-
021(3)(s)(1988)). 
132Id. at 885. 
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[t]he government’s ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions on 
socially harmful conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of 
public policy, “cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental 
action on a religious objector’s spiritual development.”  To make an 
individual’s obligation to obey such a law contingent upon the law’s 
coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the State’s interest is 
“compelling”—permitting him by virtue of his beliefs, to become a law 
unto himself,”—contradicts both constitutional tradition and common 
sense.133 
As a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith, only three types of free 
exercise claims remain subject to the compelling state interest test: (1) burdens that 
result from non-neutral laws or laws that are not generally applicable; (2) hybrid 
claims (where other constitutional violations are presented together with free 
exercise violations); and (3) when the context of government action “lends itself to 
an individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant 
conduct.”134   
With over twenty state contraceptive equity statutes and the possibility of a 
federal statute in the future, the Court’s decision in Smith takes on added 
significance.  Smith is likely to determine the constitutionality of state and potentially 
federal efforts to provide women with contraceptive coverage.   
III.  CURRENT AND PROPOSED CONTRACEPTIVE EQUITY LEGISLATION 
States have taken many different approaches to contraceptive equity statutes to 
create a balance between the First Amendment and the equality mandate of Title VII.  
Some states strike this balance with the use of “conscience clauses,” legislative 
language which exempts those with religious objections to the policy from adherence 
to the law.  This section will survey states’ contraceptive equity laws and evaluate 
their constitutionality. 
Since 1998, twenty-one states have passed legislation related to insurance 
coverage for contraceptives.135  Legislation of this type requires that employers who 
provide prescription drug benefits to provide contraceptive drug benefits to 
employees as well.136  Currently, eleven of those states have some form of 
conscience clause for religious employers.137  These provisions identify the types of 
private sector entities entitled to claim a conscientious objection to contraceptive 
coverage, what grounds should form the basis of the exemption, and how the 
deleterious impact of those objections on individuals needing contraceptive services 
                                                                
133Id. (citations omitted). 
134Cherry, supra note 98, at 587-588. 
135Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Cover My Pills: Fair Access to 
Contraception; Get The Facts, States with Laws Requiring Full Contraceptive Coverage 
(1998-2002), at http:///www.covermypills.com/facts/states_law.asp (last visited Oct. 22, 
2002).  
136Id. 
137Id.  
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can be minimized.138  This latter language is important because an employer who 
claims a religious exemption does so for all of its employees.139  For non-religious 
employees of religiously-based hospitals or universities, an exemption can be quite 
detrimental.   
Statutory text in contraceptive equity legislation tends to fall into three 
categories: those with no religious exemption, those with broad religious exemptions 
and those with narrow religious exemptions.  Some states include additional 
protective language in their legislation to give female employees information about 
their employers’ policies prior to employment.   
A.  No Religious Exemption 
The first category of contraceptive equity legislation is that with no religious 
exemption.  States such as Georgia,140 Iowa,141 New Hampshire,142 Vermont,143 and 
Virginia144 have no conscience clauses in their contraceptive equity statutes.   
Representative text from Iowa states:  
1. [A] group policy or contract providing for third-party payment or 
prepayment of health or medical expenses shall not do either of the 
following:  
a. Exclude or restrict benefits for prescription contraceptive drugs or . . . 
devices which prevent conception and which are approved by the [FDA] 
. . ., if such policy or contract provides benefits for other outpatient 
prescription drugs or devices. 
b. Exclude or restrict benefits for outpatient contraceptive services which 
are provided for the purpose of preventing conception if such policy or 
contract provides benefits for other outpatient services provided by a 
health care professional.145 
States with no religious exemption in their contraceptive equity laws are at the 
highest risk of having their laws deemed unconstitutional.  Although these statutes 
meet the requirements of Title VII, they ignore the very real religious imposition 
they create.  These laws, if challenged, are likely to be struck down because, 
although they are neutral and of general applicability, they work to inhibit religious 
                                                                
138Alan Guttmacher Institute, State Contraceptive Coverage Laws: Creative Responses to 
Questions of ‘Conscience’ (1999) at http://www.agi-usa.org/pubs/journals/gr020401.html (last 
visited Sept. 20, 2002).   
139Id.  
140GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-59.6 (2004).  
141IOWA CODE § 514C.19 (2003). 
142N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 415: 18-i (2003). 
143VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4099c (2003). 
144VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3 407.5:1 (Michie 2004). 
145IOWA CODE § 514C.19 (2003). 
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employers’ free exercise by requiring employers to financially support a policy that 
is against their religious beliefs.  
For example, under the Iowa statute, Catholic churches and monasteries are 
required to purchase benefit packages with contraceptive coverage for employees if 
they also provide prescription drug benefits.  This is most likely a violation of the 
Free Exercise clause since it works to burden a religious entity by requiring a 
practice which is in direct violation of the organization’s moral principles.  Although 
Smith146 greatly limited the scope of free exercise claims, the church would most 
likely be able to assert a hybrid claim, stating that requiring contraceptive coverage 
violates the church’s right to free speech.147  Refusal to support contraception could 
be considered a form of political speech that can be linked to the free exercise claim 
and render the statute unconstitutional.148  Although these types of claims are 
controversial and not recognized by all courts,149 the United States Supreme Court150 
and other courts have implicitly recognized their viability.151   
B.  Broad Religious Exemption 
Other states take the opposite tack and offer very broad exemptions to employers 
who find it morally objectionable to support contraception.  Some states even go so 
far as to allow insurers and health systems that are supported by religious 
organizations an exemption from providing contraceptive coverage.  Connecticut,152 
Hawaii,153 Nevada,154 and Washington155 exempt both religious employers and 
religious health care providers from providing contraceptives.   
Representative text from Connecticut states:  
[A]ny insurance company, hospital or medical services corporation,  or 
health care center may issue to a religious employer an individual health 
insurance policy that excludes coverage for prescription contraception 
methods which are contrary to the religious employer’s bona fide 
religious tenets . . . (f) as used in this section: “religious employer” means 
                                                                
146Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
147Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1109, 1122 (1990). 
148Id.  
149See supra note 130. 
150Smith, 494 U.S. 872.  
151Even if this statutory language is not found unconstitutional under the U.S. 
Constitution, it remains subject to state constitutions, which may require more stringent 
interpretation of religious free exercise. 
152CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-503e (2003). 
153HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 431:10A-116.6, 431:10A-116.7 (Michie 2003). 
154NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 695C.1715 (Michie 2004); see also § 695C.1717 (regarding 
contraceptive health care services); § 689B.0376 (regarding group and blanket health 
insurance and prescription drug coverage).   
155WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.47.160 (2004). 
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an employer that is a “qualified church controlled organization” as defined 
in 26 U.S.C. section 3121 or a church affiliated organization.156  
Legislation with such broad language places the greatest number of women at 
risk of going without contraceptive coverage, since by allowing entire insurance 
plans and religiously-based hospitals to avoid covering contraceptive services they 
exclude a large pool of workers.  Many of the hospital systems in the United States 
have their roots in religion though they employ and serve individuals of every 
religion.157  Also, hospital systems are in a process of change, becoming more 
corporatized and offering individual patients less individual choice as to their 
hospital and primary care physicians.158  Under legislation with broad exemptions, 
non-religious employees of a large corporation with an insurance benefit plan tied to 
a religiously-based hospital may be denied contraceptive coverage on the basis of the 
insurance company’s religious beliefs.  This type of legislation appears to be the type 
of restriction that Cantwell rejected as religiously motivated conduct that inflicts 
harms on others.159  In this situation, non-religious employees are harmed as a result 
of their employer-provided insurance policy, which they had little or no choice in 
negotiating or choosing.  Such broad exemptions are not protected under the Free 
Exercise Clause,160 and thus are likely to fail.161    
Other states, like Delaware,162 Maryland,163 Missouri,164 and New Mexico165 offer 
no definition of a religious employer.  Representative text from Missouri states: 
4. (1) Any health care carrier may issue to any person or entity...a health 
benefit plan that excludes coverage for contraceptives if the use or 
provision of such contraceptives is contrary to the moral, ethical, 
orreligious beliefs or tenets of such person or entity. 
(2) [exemption for enrollee for whom coverage is against moral or 
religious beliefs] 
(3) Any health carrier which is owned, operated or controlled in 
substantial part by an entity that is operated pursuant to moral, ethical, or 
religious tenets that are contrary to the use or provision of contraceptives 
                                                                
156CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-503e (2003). 
157William W. Bassett, Private Religious Hospitals: Limitations Upon Autonomous Moral 
Choices in Reproductive Medicine, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 455, 456 (2001). 
158Id.   
159Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 296.  
160Id.  
161Erickson, 141 F.Supp. 2d 1266. 
162DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 3559 (2004). 
163MD. INS. CODE ANN. § 15-826 (2004). 
164MO. REV. STAT. § 376.1199 (2001). 
165N.M. STAT.ANN. § 59A-22-42 (2004). 
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shall be exempt from the provisions of subdivision (4) of subsection 1 of 
this section.166   
These laws, if challenged, are likely to be struck down because they also do not 
meet the test in Cantwell that requires religious conduct not to inflict harm on 
others.167  Language such as the statute quoted above allows employers and service 
providers with nonreligious, moral objections to contraception to be excluded from 
the requirement of providing contraceptives.  Such language subjects the statute to 
analysis solely on the basis of Title VII, since the Free Exercise Clause is not 
implicated when moral conduct, as opposed to religious conduct, is the basis of a 
decision.168  Under statutes like these, employees of a non-religious business, the 
owners of which opposed birth control would not have contraceptive coverage.  For 
example, Wal-Mart, one of the nation’s largest employers, has decided not to provide 
birth control pills through their pharmacy.  Under statutes like these, it is not 
inconceivable that they would claim a moral exemption from the statute and leave 
their employees without adequate contraceptive services.  Again, Cantwell provides 
less protection for religious conduct that inflicts harm on others,169 and requiring 
large groups of non-believers to be burdened by their employer’s religious 
convictions creates significant harm for the employees’ reproductive health and 
imposes a financial burden upon them.  
C.  Narrow Religious Exemption 
Some states provide a narrower exemption for religious employers. 
California,170 Maine,171 North Carolina,172 and Rhode Island173 offer a religious 
exemption that includes employers who primarily employ and serve those who 
adhere to the religious tenets of the entity.   
Representative text from California states:  
(b)(1) For purposes of this section, a religious employer is an entity for 
which each of the following is true:  
(A) the inculcation of religious values is the purpose of the entity,  
(B) the entity primarily employs persons who share the religious tenets of 
the entity 
                                                                
166MO. REV. STAT. § 376.1199 (2001). 
167Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 305.  
168Because morality is not necessarily based upon religious beliefs, the First Amendment 
does not apply to moral objections. 
169Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 305  
170CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25 (2004). 
17124-A.M.R.S. § 2847-G (2003). 
172N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-3-178 (2004). 
173See R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 27-19-48, 27-18-57, 27-20-43, 27-41-59 (2004). 
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(C) the entity serves primarily persons who share the religious tenets of 
the entity  
(D) The entity is a nonprofit organization as described in 26 USC section 
6033(a)(2)(A)(i) or (iii).174 
Legislative language offering a narrow conscience clause exemption is the most 
likely language to withstand the requirements of both Title VII and the First 
Amendment.  Statutes with this type of language provide protection for religious free 
exercise and run a low risk of harming those employees who do not adhere to their 
employer’s religious tenets.   
Under statutes like these, although a non-religious employee working for a 
church would not have access to contraception, the harm would be minimal, since 
any individual church’s non-religious staff is generally small.  In addition, it is 
unlikely that there are many church staff members who vehemently disagree with the 
principals of their employer.  Contrasted to the language of the broadly-defined 
statutes, it is clear that a much smaller number of employees would face denial of 
contraceptive coverage.  In addition, employees who hold the same beliefs as their 
religious employers could choose not to utilize their contraceptive benefits.    
Large faith-based health conglomerates or service organizations, however, would 
have to provide their employees with contraceptive benefits.175  This is the issue 
brought up in Catholic Charities.176  The California Supreme Court affirmed the 
lower court decision, holding that the California law is constitutional because it does 
not interfere with religious free exercise. The law is neutral and of general 
applicability and does not fall within any of the exceptions to the doctrine the 
Supreme Court espoused in Smith.177  Organizations like Catholic Charities now have 
two choices because the California Supreme Court has ruled against them: either 
change employment policies and only employ members of the organization’s 
religion, or provide non-religious employees with access to contraceptives. 
D.  Additional Protective Language 
Some states additionally require that religious employers not offering 
contraceptive coverage give employees notice of that fact.  Representative text from 
Hawaii states: “Every religious employer that invokes the exemption provided under 
this section shall provide written notice to prospective employees prior to enrollment 
with the plan, listing the contraceptive health care services the employer refuses to 
cover for religious reasons.”178 
This text does not violate either the PDA or the Free Exercise clause and allows 
employees to be better informed before making employment choices.  Although the 
                                                                
174CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25 (2004). 
175See Catholic Charities, 32 Cal. App. 4th at 527, 90 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. 2001), aff’d, 32 
Cal. 4th 527 (Cal. 2004). 
176Id.  
177See Cherry, supra note 98, at 587-88 (citing Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 
890 (1990)). 
178HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431:10A-116.7 (2003). 
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Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),179 the federal law governing 
employee benefits, requires that employees receive understandable information about 
their insurance coverage, this requirement is frequently ignored.180  Currently, 
women often learn of their coverage limitations only after they have enrolled in the 
plan or when they submit a claim and it is denied.181  Additional protective language 
requiring notice of contraceptive coverage exclusions helps close the information 
gap that is so prevalent in current insurance practice.   
IV.  STRIKING THE BALANCE BETWEEN CONTRACEPTIVE EQUITY AND FREE EXERCISE 
A tension most certainly exists between the goals of Title VII and the First 
Amendment.  This tension, however, is not irresolvable.  To be sure, carefully 
constructed contraceptive equity legislative language is capable of walking the 
tightrope between the two principles.   
There are several principles that should guide any efforts to achieve an effective 
balance and ensure that religious employers’ rights to free exercise are not unduly 
burdened.182  First, any proposed legislation must be neutral and of general 
applicability.183  This means that conscience clauses should reflect a neutral stance, 
both on their face and in spirit.  The Court in 1993 in Church of the Lukumi Babalu 
Aye v. City of Hileah184 stated that neutrality ensures the protection of religious 
minorities from discriminatory treatment.  The Court’s interpretation of neutrality in 
free exercise cases allows the state to place a burden on religious exercise only if the 
object of the state action is not to burden religion, but instead an “incidental effect” 
of the action.185   
To avoid a “hybrid claim” under Smith, no other Constitutional rights can be 
violated.186  Some courts reject the notion of “hybrid rights” claims,187 but assuming 
the claims exist, any legislation must not have the effect of interfering with any other 
Constitutional right, e.g. freedom of speech, or the Establishment Clause.188 
Any proposed legislation must not single out any one particular religion.189  
Lukumi involved a challenge to a city ordinance which prohibited the slaughter of 
                                                                
179Law, supra note 22, at 387-88 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(1)(1944)). 
180Id. at 387. 
181Id. 387-88. 
182U.S. CONST. amend. I, XIV. 
183School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
184508 U.S. 520 (1993) rev’d and remanded to 2 F.3d 369 (11th Cir. 1993)..  
185Cherry, supra note 98, at 573. 
186Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.  
187See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 165 F.3d 692, 702-707 (9th Cir. 
1999), withdrawn, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); see also Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs., 
5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993). 
188Smith, 494 U.S. at 881. 
189Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hileah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).  
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animals in “sacrifice” or “ritual.”190  The Court found that the language of the statute 
was neutral; however, the record surrounding the city’s enactment of the ordinance 
showed that the ordinance was intended to target the Santeria religion.191  Stating that 
official action targeting religious conduct for distinctive treatment cannot be shielded 
by mere compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality,”192 the court found a 
violation of the Free Exercise Clause.193  Any language in contraceptive equity 
legislation aimed at a specific religion or denomination will not pass Constitutional 
muster.   
The fact that a particular religion is burdened by a regulation is not evidence of 
intentional targeting. This issue arose in the Catholic Charities case, where the 
plaintiffs alleged that the Catholic Church was burdened more than other religious 
denominations.  In its petition to the California Supreme Court, the state of 
California relied upon Reynolds v. United States,194 where the United States Supreme 
Court upheld the right of Congress to criminalize polygamy, even though it burdened 
Mormons more than other religious groups.195  Attorneys for the State of California 
stated that  
[A]t a minimum, Reynolds demonstrates that a neutral prohibition does 
not become unconstitutional simply because of its disparate impact on a 
particular religious organization.  Absent proof that a particular religious 
entity was unconstitutionally targeted, a valid and neutral statute survives 
First Amendment review even if its enforcement burdens some churches 
more than others.196   
Lastly, any statute must be tailored so that any religious exemption does not 
inflict harm on others who are non-adherents.197  As in Cantwell, the “religious 
conduct” of excluding contraceptives from insurance policies must not harm non-
adherents, otherwise it is not protected by the First Amendment.198   
A.  Recommendations for Appropriate Language 
The best way to protect reproductive freedom as well as free exercise is to tailor 
statutory conscience clause language to cover only organizations that primarily 
employ and serve those who are their own adherents.  The language of a narrow 
religious exemption bridges the gap between Title VII and the First Amendment.  By 
providing access to prescription contraceptive coverage, the requirements of Title 
                                                                
190Id.  
191Id. at 534. 
192Id.  
193Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 525, 535-38. 
19498 U.S. 145 (1879), overruled as stated in 745 F.2d 153 (2d Cir. 1984).   
195Id. at 161-67.   
196California Supreme Court Brief, Real Parties in Interest’s Answer Brief on the Merits.  
No. S099822 [hereinafter State of California]. 
197Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 296. 
198Id.  
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VII and the PDA are met.199  Allowing religious employers an option to be excluded 
from the legislation protects the employer’s right to free exercise.200  The narrow 
exception does more, however, by ensuring that only those most likely to not desire 
contraceptive coverage (i.e. religious adherents) are denied access to it.   
Any broader exemption would be a violation of the test in Cantwell, which 
requires that religiously motivated conduct not inflict harm on non-believers.201  
With broad exemptions, non-religious employees of places like Catholic Charities or 
religiously controlled hospital networks would not be entitled to contraceptive 
coverage, which would impose a burden on these non-adherents.  On the other hand, 
the absence of any exceptions to contraceptive equity policy would likely render it 
unconstitutional.202  The absence of exemptions would mean that individual 
congregations, in their context as employers, would have to offer contraceptives to 
their employees, causing them to support behavior that they see as morally repugnant 
to their religious beliefs and violative of their right to freely exercise their religion.203 
When states have attempted to pass equity legislation, the main objection they 
face comes from religious employers who feel threatened by the idea of the state 
requiring them to provide services that are in conflict with their religious practice.204  
In debates prior to the enactment of California’s legislation, much of the discussion 
centered specifically around crafting the language to provide for the needs of the 
Catholic church, which had heavily lobbied against the legislation.205 
Thus, for both political and constitutional reasons, states that are considering 
contraceptive equity legislation should utilize a narrow exemption.  Although state 
legislation does not ultimately protect women as much as federal legislation,206 any 
legislation giving women access to contraceptives is a step in the right direction. 
Likewise, any federal legislation, such as the Equity in Prescription Insurance and 
Contraceptive Coverage Act, should include a narrow exemption for religious 
employers.207  Federal legislation is the best way to provide the greatest number of 
women the greatest access to contraceptive coverage and a narrow religious 
exemption will offer religious employers the free exercise protection they desire.    
In addition, both state and federal legislation should include the additional 
protective clause that requires employers to provide employees with information 
about their access to contraceptive benefits.  Inclusion of this clause offers women 
critical information when they are making employment choices.  Women who 
receive this information prior to employment may opt to choose an employer who 
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provides prescription contraceptives unlike the current situation where women often 
accept a job only to find later that their contraceptive services are not covered under 
the employer’s health benefit plan.208   
Since Title VII only applies to employers with over 15 employees, it is important 
that legislation provide protection for employees of smaller firms.  To eliminate the 
issue created by Title VII employer size limits, it is essential that enacted legislation 
be available to employees of any size organization or business entity.  It is estimated 
that more than half of the workers in firms with fewer than 15 employees are 
women.209  This means that approximately one-sixth of the nation’s women workers 
are employed in such firms.210  Therefore, it is estimated that 7.66 million women are 
employed by very small employers.211  State and federal contraceptive equity 
legislation needs to provide all women with access to contraceptive services in order 
to achieve the goal of contraceptive equity.  Although excluding these 7.66 million 
women from contraceptive services may seem to protect small business from 
additional insurance costs, a closer look reveals that the slight cost of adding these 
benefits will actually assist small business people in retaining employees and 
reducing the costs associated with unwanted pregnancies.212  It is to a small 
employer’s benefit to provide their employees with prescription contraceptive 
benefits, since contraception will keep an essential employee from having an 
unwanted pregnancy and being forced to take time away from their job.  Prevention 
of unwanted pregnancies is especially important in smaller companies, since there 
are fewer available dollars for hiring temporary replacement employees or for lost 
production costs during a full time employee’s pregnancy and maternity leave.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
Women in United States do not receive equal treatment in their health insurance 
coverage.213  Providing equal health care coverage is necessary to achieve equality 
and to reduce the number of unwanted children and abortions.214   
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its later-added corollary, the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, require equal access to contraceptive services even 
when equal access requires additional cost for one gender.215   State legislation is 
similarly limited in scope due to ERISA preemption rules.216  The proposed federal 
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legislation, EPICC, is the most effective tool for protecting women against inequities 
in their insurance coverage.217   
Federal and state legislation, however, must not interfere with a religious 
employer’s right to freely exercise its religion.218   The most effective way to balance 
the ideals set forth in both Title VII and the First Amendment is to include a 
conscience clause in contraceptive equity legislation.  Narrowly-tailored legislative 
language would provide the greatest number of employees with access to 
contraceptives while protecting religious employers from government infringement 
on their free exercise rights.   
In addition to the conscience clause, legislation which requires employers 
claiming conscience protection to provide employees with prior notice regarding the 
lack of contraceptive coverage will offer these employees vital information when 
making career choices.   
Narrowly tailored conscience clauses in contraceptive equity legislation create a 
bridge between the competing ideals of Title VII and the First Amendment.  By 
properly addressing both the need for contraceptive equity and the right to religious 
freedom, contraceptive equity legislation that has a narrow religious exemption 
strikes the appropriate balance between the interests of preventing unwanted 
pregnancy and ensuring religious freedom.    
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